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Abstract
In this article, we provide evidence that civilian and military government spending have specific characteristics that can 
affect private consumption differently. Our vector autoregressive (VAR) estimates for the US economy for the period 
1960–2013 show that civilian expenditure induces a positive and significant response on private consumption, whereas 
military spending has a negative impact. We also analyze the effects of these public spending components for the 
subsamples 1960–79 and 1983–2013, respectively. Our results show that the main transmission channels of both 
civilian and military expenditures have changed over time. We adopt a new Keynesian approach and develop a dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in order to simulate the empirical evidence. Both the larger persistence of 
shocks in military spending and the different financing mechanisms, which account for the propensity of policymakers 
to use budget deficits to finance wars, mimic the differences in the empirical responses of private consumption. 
Simulated impulse response functions of alternative specification models prove the robustness of our analysis. In 
particular, we assess the impact of civilian and military shocks in the presence of different (i) shares of heterogeneous 
households, (ii) price rigidities, and (iii) monetary reactions in response to different government shocks.
Keywords
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, military and civilian spending, structural vector 
autoregressive (SVAR) model
Introduction
Recently, US public opinion has shown renewed interest
in the economic impact of fiscal policy. At the end of
2013, an intense debate and media coverage concerned
the US federal government shutdown. The tensions that
ultimately produced this shutdown arose due to the dif-
ferent perspectives of policymakers concerning the defi-
cit reduction through a simultaneous increase in tax rates
and decrease in government spending.1 The main
motivation of this debate is that the economic literature
did not provide conclusive results regarding how public
expenditure and its financing mechanism can affect the
economic performance of the private sector. In general,
contrasting results mainly depend on the theoretical per-
spective and the empirical methodology used (Cogan
et al., 2010).
The neoclassical approach suggests an intuitive expla-
nation to account for the economic effects of large cycli-
cal rises in government spending. Based on major
unexpected political events, it assumes that the periods
of increased military spending correspond to the dates of
Corresponding author:
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1 In this regard, Feldstein (2008) argued that any Department of
Defense (DoD) budget cuts may be misguided. He also suggested
that in the recent downturn cycle, the US government should have
recognized the need to increase government spending to offset the
decline in consumer demand in the economy, and stated that a rise in
military spending would be the best way to provide this stimulus.
war or threats of war. Ramey & Shapiro (1999), later
extended by Ramey (2011), proposed a so-called ‘narra-
tive’ approach, which selected the start of the three wars
in which the USA actively intervened (i.e. Korean,
Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) and the
2001 terrorist attack, to identify empirically large exo-
genous increases in US defense spending. The significant
criticism of this approach (modeled by the ‘expectations
augmented vector autoregressive’ – EVAR – specifica-
tions) is that other substantial fiscal shocks may have
occurred at the same time. In turn, these other shocks
may interfere with the identification of military shocks,
implying distorted results.2
The economic literature has proposed an alternative
approach to test the effects of fiscal policy on economy.
In particular, a large set of studies has focused on struc-
tural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models with differ-
ences in the identification issues of fiscal shocks.3
Although Bouakez, Chihi & Normandin (2014) have
recently criticized this approach, Perotti (2014) has
clearly shown that SVAR models properly identified
achieve the same results as the EVAR by Ramey (2011).
In this article, we review the economic consequences
of changes in US fiscal policy following a baseline SVAR
model extended for the fiscal components of military and
civilian spending. The main question of interest is
whether unexpected military and non-military expendi-
tures produce ‘contractionary’ or ‘expansionary’ effects
on private consumption, respectively. We contribute to
the existing literature by showing that differences in pri-
vate consumption effects are based on how the shocks of
government spending components are driven by their
persistence and types of financing mechanisms.
We base our hypotheses on the findings of Gali,
Lopez-Salido & Valles (2007) who show that a positive
government spending shock leads to a significant
increase in private consumption when defense expendi-
ture is excluded. Accordingly, they infer the hypothesis
that military spending has a negligible or negative impact
on consumption. However, previous literature found
conflicting empirical results about the effects of different
public spending components on consumption and other
macroeconomic variables. Using a partial equilibrium
model, Pieroni (2009) has shown that private consump-
tion responds negatively to military expenditure
increases. In terms of private investment, the findings
by Smith (1980) showed the so-called ‘crowding-out’
effect. On the contrary, Aschauer (1989) provided evi-
dence that positive government spending shocks
induced an increase in private investment. More
recently, F-de-Co´rdoba & Torres (2016), using a DSGE
model with a security factor in the utility function, have
found that the increase in the external threat induced a
rise in military spending, investment and output while it
reduced consumption. Finally, Malizard (2015) pro-
vided evidence of a positive effect on private investment
due to military equipment spending (considered as pub-
lic investment) for the case of France.
As in Blanchard & Perotti (2002), who estimated
output fiscal effects, we report a comparison of the vector
autoregressive (VAR) effects of military and civilian
spending shocks on consumption for the USA: although
we estimate a negative effect of military expenditure on
consumption, our results show that civilian government
purchases have a largely positive effect on private con-
sumption. In order to check the robustness of our
empirical analysis, we compare the different impacts of
civilian and military spending for two subsamples that
correspond to the periods before and after the ‘great
moderation’.4 Our results indicate that the transmission
channels of both civilian and military shocks have chan-
ged over time. Regarding civilian spending, we find that
the responses of macroeconomic aggregates are less sig-
nificant in the post-1980 sample. On the contrary, the
effects of military shocks are mostly significant in the
second subsample.
In this article, following the most recent literature
(see, among others, Jacob, 2015), we develop a new
Keynesian model to mimic the empirical results. This
framework offers the advantage of taking into account
forward-looking expectations of households and firms,
and encompasses many ingredients of modern dynamic
optimizing sticky-price models, although it is modified
2 As an example of this debate, Perotti (2005: 5) argued that ‘Ramey
and Shapiro date the start of the Korean war shock in 1950:Q3, based
on the large observed increase in military spending; but in four
quarters between 1948:Q2 and 1950:Q3, government spending
increased by between two and three standard deviations. It is not
obvious how to disentangle the effects of the Korean dummy
variable from the delayed effects of these large fiscal shocks.’
3 A very large body of empirical literature includes structural
restrictions of impulse response functions (Enders, Muller &
Scholl, 2011), relations among variables and error terms in the
structural form (Corsetti, Meier & Muller, 2012), or external
institutional information, which tends to exploit the quarterly
nature of data and fiscal policy decision lags (Perotti, 2005).
4 With the term ‘great moderation’ we refer to the period in which
the US economy experienced a reduction in the volatility of business
cycle fluctuations. In particular, starting in the 1980s major US
economic variables such as real gross domestic product and
inflation began to decline in volatility.
by allowing for the presence of consumers subject to
credit constraints. In particular, we consider an economy
populated by a continuum of infinitely lived households
that are divided into Ricardians and non-Ricardians.
Ricardians can trade securities and accumulate physical
capital, whereas non-Ricardians do not have access to
capital markets and simply consume their current labor
income.5 The advantage of such an approach is straight-
forward. Despite the negative wealth effect associated
with an increase in the tax burden, the response of aggre-
gate consumption to a spending shock can be positive
under the presence of non-Ricardian consumers (Gali,
Lopez-Salido & Valles, 2007).
In our theoretical model, we extend the original
framework of Bilbiie, Meier & Muller (2008) by disen-
tangling civilian and military spending shocks. We moti-
vate our framework according to the two main findings
of our empirical estimates. First, we observe a stronger
persistence of military spending shock than civilian
spending shock. In particular, the high persistence of the
military spending shock increases the negative wealth
effect on Ricardian households and further lowers their
consumption spending. As a consequence, we observe
the fall in aggregate consumption in response to this
shock. Second, our empirical estimates show the effects
of a different financing mechanism of civilian and mili-
tary expenditures. The former is mainly financed by the
increase in taxation rate, while the latter is mainly funded
by government budget deficit. In this regard, the hetero-
geneity of consumers also implies different transmission
channels through which fiscal policy affects the econ-
omy. In our analysis, this issue is particularly important
in order to examine the different effects of military and
civilian spending. In contrast to Favero & Giavazzi
(2007), who explicitly include the long-run government
budget constraint, the new Keynesian model presented
below comprises, along with a taxation rule, a deficit
financing rule.
Our simulated results of the baseline new Keynesian
model show that private consumption responds posi-
tively to civilian spending whereas military expenditure
negatively affects private consumption. Some robustness
tests are presented in order to compare the dynamic
responses of private consumption to a different persis-
tence and financing mechanisms of civilian and military
spending shocks. We also analyze the impact of these
two components of government spending on private
consumption in the cases of different shares of Ricardian
households and degrees of price rigidities. Finally, we
assess the effects of different fiscal shocks when monetary
policy changes.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. First,
we discuss the basic literature and some stylized facts of
how the USA finances government spending. Second,
we present our empirical specifications illustrating the
data and discussing the empirical results. Third, we
present our theoretical framework and the model cali-
bration. Fourth, we examine the simulated impulse
responses of consumption to the different government
spending shocks and the robustness analysis. Finally,
we offer a concluding discussion.
Private consumption and the financing
mechanism of military expenditure
Barro (1979, 1981) conducted several studies high-
lighting the economic effects of government spending
and the alternative methods and impacts of financing
this expenditure. In particular, Barro (1981) stressed
the fact that government expenditures can provide
direct welfare to economic agents and that variations
in the level of government expenditure may have an
impact on the consumption decisions of households.
Based on this work, one strand of the literature shows
that different financing sources of public sector com-
ponents lead to heterogeneous effects on private con-
sumption when consumers are constrained in their asset
purchases.
In this section, we focus on the different mechanisms
used to finance military spending in the USA. We focus
on the shocks near wartime, including threats of war.
Our analysis follows the US war episodes described by
Ramey (2011) except for the Korean War, which is out-
side our sample. In particular, we focus on the patterns of
government budget deficit and tax revenues. In this
regard, in the left column of Figure 1, dashed black lines
indicate the ‘actual’ patterns of US government deficit in
each war episode. As a comparison, solid black lines
denote the ‘counterfactual’ levels of government budget
deficit, assuming no change relative to the first quarter of
each war episode. Similarly, the right column of Figure 1
shows the same comparison in the case of tax revenues.
We observe that government deficit substantially
increases in all these episodes. On the contrary, tax rev-
enues fall over the same periods. The only exception is
the Carter–Reagan military buildup. However, we note
5 See Campbell & Mankiw (1989) for the original description of the
economic behaviour of non-Ricardian consumers, and Baker (2015)
for the importance of debt held by households in the presence of
income fluctuations.
that this increase is much lower (about 1%) than the rise
in government deficit (about 6%) implying that almost
the whole burden of military outlay has been financed
through borrowing from the public.
We emphasize our article’s contribution arguing that
the effect of military spending on private consumption
also depends on the financing mechanism. In particular,
unplanned episodes such as wars are generally financed
Figure 1. Financing mechanisms in the US for military conflicts and episodes
Government budget deficit and tax revenues as percentages of GDP are taken from OECD Economic Outlook, No. 90. In particular,
government budget deficit is obtained as the difference between total disbursements and total receipts of general government
by budget deficits. Thus, from a Keynesian perspective,
since greater military outlay is not offset by the contrac-
tion induced by higher taxes, wars typically cause a short-
term economic boom boosting aggregate demand and
consumption. As argued by Nincic & Cusack (1979)
and Krell (1981), this is one of the main economic
explanations of increases in military spending. However,
Barker, Dunne & Smith (1991) have shown that such
increases have contractionary effects on the UK econ-
omy. In particular, these authors assumed that the
defense reductions are matched by balanced increases
in other public expenditures. As a consequence, they
found that consumption expenditures and GDP increase
in response to cuts in military spending. Given these
conflicting findings, our main objective is to provide a
more formal assessment of the effects of different public
spending components on private consumption, account-
ing for the several transmission channels through which
these shocks affect the US economy.
Empirical evidence
In this section, we empirically analyze several transmis-
sion mechanisms through which public spending com-
ponents affect private consumption. In particular, we
estimate the impulse response functions based on the
shocks to civilian and military expenditures.
Specification and identification
As a baseline specification of our model, we adopt a
SVAR. Its reduced form is defined by the following
dynamic equation:
Yt ¼ c þ AðLÞYt1 þUt ð1Þ
where Yt indicates the vector of variables specified below,
AðLÞ is an auto-regressive lag polynomial, c is a constant
term and Ut is the vector of reduced-form innovations.
Our analysis is focused on the US economy and our
sample period is 1960:Q1 to 2013:Q4, which is chosen
for reasons of data availability. In particular, we use the
OECD Economic Outlook no. 90 database as primary
source for most of our variables.6 The quarterly series for
military and civilian spending are taken from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. As a limitation of our analysis, the
absence of long time series at quarterly frequency for
government spending components in other countries
different from the USA does not allow us an interna-
tional comparison.
Our empirical strategy based on quarterly data is in
line with the new Keynesian perspective, which main-
tains that a discretionary fiscal policy plausibly does not
respond within a quarter to a change in the economy.7
From an empirical point of view, a substantial issue is
associated with the perspective that private agents receive
signals about future changes in government spending
before these changes take place. This, in turn, should
affect the validity of the SVAR representation. In partic-
ular, the anticipation effect of the expenditure in the
military sector argued by Ramey (2011) may lead to
differences in the shock effects of this component on the
economy. Therefore, following previous economic liter-
ature on this topic, we include dummy variables in the
‘military’ VAR system controlling for anticipation
effects.8 More specifically, these dummies correspond
to the dates accounting for the major military events,
as described in Ramey & Shapiro (1999). These dates
are: 1965:Q1, 1980:Q1, 2001:Q3.9
We estimate the impulse responses of military and
civilian spending shocks separately with a five-variable
VAR because they are not significantly linked, identifying
different transmission effects on the economy. Following
the strategy outlined in Equation (1), first we specify the
model analyzing the effects of the civilian component:
Yt ¼ ½Ct ;Wt ;DINCt ;BDt ;NMt  ð2Þ
where Ct denotes the log of real private consumption,
Wt the log of real wage, DINCt the log of real disposable
income, BDt the government budget deficit and NMt
civilian spending. More specifically, civilian spending is
obtained as the difference between government con-
sumption expenditure and national defense data.10 Both
civilian spending and budget deficit enter the VAR as a
ratio of current GDP. Our choice is motivated both by
the easier interpretation in terms of measurement of
consumption responses that are expressed as unit
changes and in order to be consistent with our DSGE
model (see, for example, Gali, Lopez-Salido & Valles,
6 Although there are more recent versions of the OECD Economic
Outlook Database, some of these updated series are not consistent
with the data in the earlier years of our sample.
7 We follow the approach used by Auerbach (2000).
8 See, for example, Leeper, Walker & Yang (2013).
9 With respect to Ramey (2011), the Korean date (1950:Q1) is
excluded because it is outside of our sample.
10 Since we are interested in the short-run effects of government
spending shocks on private consumption, we omit public
investment from the data. As a robustness check, we considered
both public consumption and public investment and we obtained
results that are very close to those presented below.
2007; Bilbiie, Meier & Muller, 2008). All the remaining
real variables are expressed in per capita terms.11
As an identification strategy for fiscal policy shocks,
we adopt a Cholesky factorization in order to recover the
vector of structural shocks et (and its variance ) from the
reduced-form error Ut in Equation (1). It is worthwhile
noticing that the structural identification of Blanchard &
Perotti (2002) of government spending shocks is iden-
tical to a Choleski decomposition, in which government
spending is ordered before the other variables.12 In par-
ticular, we assume the following set of conditions. We
consider civilian spending as the most exogenous vari-
able. The interaction between civilian expenditure and
taxation rate influences the budget deficit: if the civilian
spending increase is financed by tax rises, the budget
deficit may be negative. Conversely, if a civilian expen-
diture rise is not followed by a corresponding increase in
taxation rate, the budget deficit is positive. We implicitly
allow for heterogeneous consumers (namely, Ricardians
and non-Ricardians). Because household demand for
goods depends on the expected value of taxes (i.e. disposa-
ble income), each household subtracts its share of this pres-
ent value (real wage) from the expected present value of
income in order to determine a net wealth position. Lastly,
we consider private consumption as the most endogenous
variable, which is therefore affected by all contempora-
neous values of all the variables in the VAR.
Since our main focus is on the comparison of the
private consumption effects of civilian and military
shocks, we repeat the same experiment substituting civil-
ian expenditure ðNMtÞ with military spending ðMtÞ in
the VAR model. In this case, the vector of variables Yt in
Equation (1) may be expressed as:
Yt ¼ ½Ct ;Wt ;DINCt ;BDt ;Mt  ð3Þ
Similar to the civilian spending case, military
spending enters the VAR as a ratio of current GDP.
Again, we adopt a Cholesky factorization in which
private consumption, real wages, disposable income
and budget deficits are allowed to depend on the
fiscal variable (in this case, military expenditure) and
are ordered, respectively.
Finally, we focus on one issue that has been highly
disputed in the recent literature on the effects of fiscal
components on the economy. In particular, many
authors (see, for example, Leeper, Plante & Traum,
2010) have argued that the specific characteristic of the
government expenditure in VARmodels is its persistence
driven by the presence of trends. In this regard, military
spending has a clear downward trend, while civilian
spending is more stationary.13 In general, the presence
of trends in fiscal series (as shares of GDP) is not limited
to non-defense spending, but is pervasive. For instance,
in the dataset used by Leeper, Plante & Traum (2010) to
estimate a DSGE model using Bayesian techniques, tax
revenues, transfers and government spending (all as
shares of GDP) have different trends. Therefore, we deal
with those trends, including the linear trend in the
model specification.
Results
We estimate two VAR models according to Equations (2)
and (3) in order to obtain the empirical impulse response
functions (IRFs). According to the Schwarz information
criterion, the number of lags is set to two. Diagnostic tests
indicate the absence of serial correlation in the residuals by
a Lagrange multiplier test. We do not reject the hypothesis
of normality of residuals with Jarque-Bera statistics and
check the stability condition of the VAR, finding that all
eigenvalues lie comfortably inside the unit circle.
Figure 2 shows the effects of civilian spending on the
endogenous variables in Equation (2). In order to derive
the 5th and 95th percentiles of the impulse response
distribution in the graphs, error bands are computed
by Monte Carlo simulations assuming normality in the
parameter distribution. Accordingly, we construct t-tests
based on 10,000 different responses generated by simu-
lations and check whether the point estimates of the
mean impulse responses are statistically different from
zero. The responses of the five variables are expressed
by multiplying the estimated parameters of the VAR
by the sample average share of civilian spending in GDP.
We note that civilian spending (graph a) increases
significantly and does not display a large persistence. In
contrast to military spending shock, the pattern of per-
sistence decreases with a half-life of about two years. The
response of the budget deficit variable (graph b) indicates
a contrasting pattern: although it starts positively, it
decreases and remains significantly negative, suggesting
that unexpected civilian expenditure is financed by an
increase in the taxation rate.Weobserve a positive response
for disposable income (graph c) for the time-length consid-
ered. This result is in line with the prediction of the new
11 The Online appendix provides a detailed description of data
sources and construction.
12 As in Blanchard & Perotti (2002), the condition for identification
is that the component of government spending does not respond to
government or private macroeconomic variables, contemporaneously. 13 See Figure E1 in the Online appendix.
Keynesian models, where the low persistence of civilian
spending shock along with constraints in asset market
participation reduces the wealth effect on Ricardian
households. As predicted by the new Keynesian models,
real wage (graph d) shows a positive and persistent
response to a unitary shock of civilian spending. Most
interestingly, the effect of a civilian expenditure shock
on consumption is shown to be significant for a large
timespan, persistently above zero (graph e). As we can
observe, the response of consumption follows that of
disposable income.
Figure 3 displays the IRFs obtained from the VAR
expressed in Equation (3) as a response to a positive
shock in military spending. Defense expenditure
response (graph a) rises significantly, showing a higher
persistence with respect to the civilian shock. From the
patterns of IRFs, we estimate that the half-life period is
above eight years. Graph b pertains to the estimated
response of the budget deficit variable, reproducing the
evidence that, in the USA, the defense sector is largely
financed by budget deficits. The response of disposable
income is negative (graph c); this effect is driven by the
high persistence of military spending shock that
strengthens the wealth effect on Ricardian households.
The point estimates shown in the IRFs indicate that the
real wage decreases in response to the military spending
shock (graph d). Interestingly, as found in the neoclassi-
cal literature, the pattern of consumption also decreases
its impact (graph e), and the point estimates reveal that
the shock may produce a significant effect. The con-
sumption follows the pattern of the real disposable
income response.
Following the recent literature investigating the sti-
mulative effects of fiscal actions (Drautzburg & Uhlig,
2015; Leeper, Traum &Walker, 2015; Canzoneri et al.,
2016), we test the estimated impact multipliers on con-
sumption. In particular, the impact multiplier on con-
sumption measures the change in the level of
consumption k periods ahead in response to a change
in the fiscal variable of interest given by Ft at time t :
14
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Figure 2. Response of the VAR model to a civilian spending shock
Estimated impulse responses to a civilian spending shock in SVAR. Sample period 1960:Q1 to 2013:Q4. Vertical axis: deviations from
unshocked path. Horizontal axis: quarters after shock. Confidence intervals at the usual 95% significance level based on 10,000 Monte Carlo
replications.
14 For example, the civilian spending multiplier is computed as
follows, Ctþk
NMt
¼ %Ctþk
%NMt
C
NM
, where C and NM are the steady
state values of consumption and civilian expenditure, respectively.
In particular, C and NM are obtained as the average values of the
real non-military expenditure and the real private consumption over
the period 1960:Q1–2013:Q4, respectively.
Impact multiplier k periods ahead ¼ Ctþk
Ft
 
ð4Þ
Thus, the civilian spending impact multiplier is given
by CtþkNMt and the military spending impact multiplier is
given by CtþkMt . Table I shows the results for the estimated
impact multipliers on consumption. Particularly interest-
ing for our study is the fact that positive multipliers on
consumption of civilian expenditure, for the 1st, 4th, 8th
and 12th quarters, are 0:19, 0:56, 0:82 and 0:89, respec-
tively. On the contrary (as expected from the point esti-
mates), consumption multipliers are negative for military
expenditure for the same quarters, between0:10,0:19,
0:23 and 0:26, respectively. Confidence intervals of
these government expenditures at 95% also indicate a sta-
tistical significance of separate consumption multipliers,
emphasizing important differences in the IRF responses
of military and civilian expenditure shocks on private con-
sumption. As a robustness check, we also computed the
civilian and military impact multipliers on output.15
Overall, our findings related to civilian spending are
in line with the results by Ricco & Ellahie (2012). In
particular, we provide evidence that increases in the
non-military component positively influence US GDP.
Moreover, we confirm the predictions of two articles
that have analyzed the impact of military spending on
the macroeconomy. First, as in Nincic & Cusack
(1979), we find that private consumption falls in
response to military spending increases. Second, as in
Barker, Dunne & Smith (1991), we show the negative
impact of defense expenditure on both consumption
and GDP.
Pre- and post-great moderation: Subsample estimates
In this section, we compare the different impacts of
civilian and military spending for two subsamples in
order to check the robustness of our empirical analy-
sis. Our sample choice reflects the well-established
hypothesis of a structural break in the early 1980s
(see, among others, Smets & Wouters, 2007; Bilbiie,
Meier & Muller, 2008). In particular, we assume that
the first sample period, the so-called ‘great inflation’,
ends in 1979:Q2, namely, the beginning of the
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Figure 3. Response of the VAR model to a military spending shock
Estimated impulse responses to a military spending shock in SVAR. Sample period 1960:Q1 to 2013:Q4. Vertical axis: deviations from
unshocked path. Horizontal axis: quarters after shock. Confidence intervals at the usual 95% significance level based on 10,000 Monte Carlo
replications.
15 Since in this article we focus on the effects on private
consumption, we report these results in the Online appendix.
Volcker chairmanship.16 The second subsample starts
in 1983:Q1 and corresponds to the more recent
period of the ‘great moderation’ in which inflation
was relatively low and stable. This sample split cap-
tures the general changes in US business cycle
dynamics. Therefore, we estimate our civilian and
military VARs for the two samples: 1960:Q1–
1979:Q2 (S1) and 1983:Q1–2013:Q4 (S2). In the
Online appendix, Figures E.2 and E.3 show the esti-
mated IRFs for both the subsamples that we obtained
applying the same technique as above.
First, we observe that the persistence of the civilian
shock is higher in S2 than in S1. Moreover, government
budget deficit falls following this shock in both subsam-
ples. This pattern confirms that, historically, civilian
expenditure has been financed through increases in taxa-
tion. Disposable income and real wage responses are
significantly positive in S1 but not in S2. Interestingly,
we find an evident ‘crowding-in’ effect on private con-
sumption in S1, whereas the response is not significant
in S2. Accordingly, these results confirm that the differ-
ences in the persistence of the civilian shock in S1 and S2
crucially influence the response of private consumption.
Turning to the effects of military spending, we find that
the military shock is more persistent in S2 than S1. More-
over, the responses of theUSmacroeconomic aggregates are
negligible and not significant in the pre-1980 sample. On
the contrary, the responses of S2 aremostly significant for an
extended period. An increase inmilitary spending induces a
rise in the government budget deficit. This result confirms
the estimated finding of the overall sample, namely,military
spending is financed through the increase of budget deficit.
Both disposable income and real wage show a negative
response to an increase in military expenditure. As a con-
sequence, private consumption falls after the shock.
Finally, we compute the consumption multipliers for
both subsamples (Table II). In general, we find that the
transmission mechanisms for the different shocks of fiscal
components have changed over time. With regard to civil-
ian spending, the stronger persistence of the shock in S2
with respect to S1 implies that the estimated multipliers
are systematically higher in the pre-1980 sample. Turning
to military expenditure, the lower persistence of the shock
in the ‘great inflation’ period induces slightly positive con-
sumption multipliers for all the quarters considered.17
Theoretical model and calibration
Our theoretical framework is fully consistent with the
empirical strategy of the previous section. Indeed, we
adopt a solution of our DSGE model that implies that
the several variables are expressed as their respective log
deviations from the model steady state. Therefore, an
unanticipated shock to civilian (or military) spending
causes the temporary change of any given variable of our
model before returning to its steady state. Accordingly,
this interpretation of civilian and military shocks fits
consistently with the results of the impulse response
analysis of our estimated structural VARs. In what fol-
lows, we briefly describe the key features of our model,
which follows the framework of Gali, Lopez-Salido &
Valles (2007).18 In particular, the model consists of an
economy in which households are divided into Ricar-
dians and non-Ricardians.
As regards labor market structure, it is assumed that
there is an economy-wide union setting wages in a cen-
tralized manner. Hence, hours worked are not chosen
optimally by households, but are determined by firms,
given the wage set by the union. The economy produces
a single final good and a continuum of intermediate
Table I. Estimated fiscal policy effects (civilian and military spending) on consumption
Estimated fiscal policy multipliers on private consumption
Quarters 1 4 8 12
Civilian spending 0.19 0.56 0.82 0.89
[0.16/0.22] [0.52/0.59] [0.77/0.88] [0.84/0.94]
Military spending –0.10 –0.19 –0.23 –0.26
[–0.08/–0.12] [–0.16/–0.21] [–0.20/–0.27] [–0.22/–0.29]
Results from cumulated IRFs. 95% confidence intervals are listed in brackets.
16 With the term ‘great inflation’ we refer to the period that lasted
nearly two decades in which there were four economic recessions, two
severe energy shortages, and the unprecedented peacetime
implementation of wage and price controls.
17 In the Online appendix, we show that the results for the estimated
multipliers on output mimic those of consumption.
18 The Online appendix gives a more detailed description of the
model and its log-linearized conditions.
goods. The aggregate production function includes both
capital and labor inputs. The total factor productivity is
assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process.
The final goods sector is perfectly competitive and is
consumed by households.
There is monopolistic competition in the markets for
intermediate goods, each of which is produced by a sin-
gle firm. Moreover, we assume that each intermediate
goods producer faces restrictions in the price setting pro-
cess, as in Calvo (1983). The model encompasses a mon-
etary authority that sets its policy instrument, the
nominal interest rate, according to a generalized Taylor
(1993) rule.
Turning to the fiscal sector, we assume that the gov-
ernment finances its public spending by issuing bonds
and raising lump-sum taxes. Moreover, government
purchases are separated into civilian and military com-
ponents. Accordingly, we assume a fiscal policy rule
that includes two different public spending compo-
nents.19 Civilian and military expenditures evolve exo-
genously, following two distinct first-order
autoregressive processes. Indeed, we assume that the
resources destined for civilian and military sectors are
AR(1) processes in line with the dynamic responses of
our VAR-based estimates.20
Finally, the goods market clearing condition
requires that the final goods market is in equilibrium
if production equals demand by total household con-
sumption, aggregate private investment and total gov-
ernment spending.
We propose a model calibration with quarterly data
starting from ‘standard’ parameters extracted from new
Keynesian literature. Table III summarizes their values
and sources. In what follows, we focus only on the para-
meters describing the fiscal sector which are estimated
from our sample. In particular, the values of the
responses of taxes to civilian (nm) and military (m)
expenditures are obtained as the difference of the esti-
mated effects of the VAR in civilian/military expendi-
tures and the budget deficit. In line with the findings in
the literature, the estimates for our sample are of
nm¼0.16 and m¼0.18.
We also estimate the persistence parameters of civilian
and military expenditures, nm and m, according to the
procedure proposed by Marques (2005), in which the
absence of mean reversion of a given series is measured
by using the following statistic:
 ¼ 1 n
t
ð5Þ
where n denotes the number of times the series
crosses the mean during a time interval with t obser-
vations. Monte Carlo simulations have shown the
validity and consistency of this estimator in order to
Table II. Subsample estimates, fiscal policy effects (civilian and military spending) on consumption
S1: Estimated fiscal policy multipliers on private consumption
Quarters 1 4 8 12
Civilian spending 0.97 1.71 1.83 1.38
[0.92/1.03] [1.62/1.79] [1.75/1.91] [1.31/1.45]
Military spending 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.06
[0.12/0.17] [0.09/0.18] [0.07/0.18] [0.00/0.12]
S2: Estimated fiscal policy multipliers on private consumption
Quarters 1 4 8 12
Civilian spending –0.23 0.02 0.35 0.59
[–0.20/–0.25] [–0.03/0.06] [0.21/0.49] [0.52/0.65]
Military spending –0.27 –0.63 –0.98 –1.24
[–0.23/–0.30] [–0.58/–0.67] [–0.92/–1.03] [–1.17/–1.30]
Results from cumulated IRFs. 95% confidence intervals are listed in brackets.
19 In particular, our fiscal policy rule is an extension of those
commonly used in the literature (see, for example, Bohn, 1998;
Gali, Lopez-Salido & Valles, 2007).
20 Following Smets & Wouters (2007), in a previous version of this
article we included the total factor productivity (TFP) in the
government spending processes in order to account for the
misspecification of the DSGE common trend. The results obtained
in the two different versions are almost unchanged.
obtain this measure of persistence. Our VAR-based
estimates indicate the lower persistence of civilian
spending shock, whereas the higher persistence
appears in the estimated patterns of military expendi-
ture. By using the persistent estimator in Equation
(5), after detrending the time series of the fiscal com-
ponents, we obtain n ¼ 40 for civilian and n ¼ 15 for
military spending, such as we have nm ¼ 0:81 and
m ¼ 0:93, respectively, for t ¼ 216.21
Finally, we calibrate the parameter b such that it is
consistent with the necessary and sufficient condition for
non-explosive deficit dynamics. Thus, we set b equal to
0.1. In this regard, the value of the parameter indicating
the response of taxes to budget deficit has been estimated
by a large number of empirical works (see, among others,
Bilbiie, Meier &Muller, 2008; Leeper, Plante & Traum,
2010). In our specific case, since our fiscal rule is very
similar to that adopted by Gali, Lopez-Salido & Valles
(2007), we chose a value that lies in the range of esti-
mates provided by these authors.
Impulse response analysis of the simulated
model
In this section, we present the impulse response analysis
for the theoretical model described above. Our objective
is to compare simulated IRFs with those obtained from
the SVAR. We present the key figures of our analysis in
detail in a supplementary Online appendix and summar-
ize those results below.
Implications for the model with heterogeneous fiscal policy
shocks
We first discuss the implications of the model in the case
of a positive civilian spending shock. In the Online
appendix, Figure E.4 shows that the persistence of this
shock is very low. Interestingly, this result confirms our
empirical findings. In particular, the low persistence of
civilian spending shock reduces the negative wealth
effect on Ricardian agents. These perceive that the
increase in the tax burden in present value terms is only
temporary, and they do not significantly change their
consumption level.
In addition, one year after the shock, the budget def-
icit becomes negative and remains persistently below
zero for all the horizons considered. Thus, the reduction
of the budget deficit moves further resources to con-
sumption of Ricardian agents.
Real wages increase after the shock to civilian spend-
ing. This result can be explained by the substantial rise of
labor demand, since the civilian spending shock causes
an increase in the aggregate demand. Due to sticky
prices, not all firms can adjust their prices after the shock.
Firms that cannot change their prices are forced to
change their production quantity. Thus, in order to
increase their output, firms raise their demand for labor
and the new equilibrium in the labor market implies a
higher real wage. As a consequence, the disposable
incomes of both non-Ricardians and Ricardians increase.
Accordingly, we observe the so called ‘crowding-in’ effect
Table III. Calibrated parameters of the model
Parameter Symbol Value Target/Source
Discount factor  0.99 Steady state real interest rate: 0.04
El. of inv. wrt capital stock value  1 King & Watson (1996)
Capital depreciation rate  0.025 Annual depreciation on capital: 0.10
Fraction of non-Ricardians  0.5 Gali, Lopez-Salido & Valles (2007)
Capital share in the prod. fun.  1/3 Labour share: 70%
El. of wages wrt hours worked ’ 0.2 Rotemberg & Woodford (1999)
Price mark-up parameter 	p 0.2 Gali, Lopez-Salido & Valles (2007)
Calvo price probability 
 0.65 Average price duration: four quarters
Policy rate response to inflation  1.5 Clarida, Gali & Gertler (2000)
Response of taxes to civilian spending nm 0.16 Estimates from our data sample
Response of taxes to military spending m 0.18 Estimates from our data sample
Response of taxes to budget deficit b 0.1 Calibrated
Persistence of civilian spending nm 0.81 Estimates from our sample
Persistence of military spending m 0.93 Estimates from our sample
Calibration of the parameters based on quarterly data.
21 These estimates are obtained from the same series used in the
empirical section, that is, NMt and Mt are expressed as relative
shares of GDP. Moreover, we detrend these series with the HP
filter (smoothing parameter equal to 1,600).
on total consumption spending. The higher disposable
income of non-Ricardians induces a substantial increase
in their consumption level, which leads to the rise of
private consumption expenditure.
Turning to the effects of a rise in military spending,
from Figure E.5 in the Online appendix, we note a high
level of persistence of military expenditure in line with
our estimated results. As a consequence, the negative
wealth effect on Ricardian households is substantial.
Indeed, these agents decide to postpone their consump-
tion because they perceive that the increase in the tax
burden will last for a long period.
The budget deficit expands after the shock. This
result is in accordance with the idea that policymakers
in periods of uncertainty, such as wars or threat episodes,
react to the conflict challenges and their uncertainty by
developing preferences to postpone taxation to future
generations. However, the increase of budget deficit fur-
ther reduces the incentive for consumption in the Ricar-
dian households that end up holding all the bonds issued
by government.
The increase in military spending causes a reduction
of real wage. This effect is mainly due to a positive shift
of labour supply. Non-Ricardians choose to increase
their hours worked because of the rise in the tax bur-
den. Similarly, Ricardian households increase their
labour supply for a given wage. The new equilibrium
in the labour market implies a lower real wage. There-
fore, we observe that the military spending shock
reduces the disposable income of non-Ricardian and
Ricardian households, inducing the ‘crowding-out’
effect on consumption.
Robustness
In line with recent new Keynesian models, our theo-
retical framework includes several features that allow
us to analyze several transmission channels through
which civilian and military shocks affect private con-
sumption. First, we focus on the implications of the
different persistence of each fiscal shock. Second, we
assess the importance of distinct financing mechan-
isms of public spending. Third, we study the impact
of different fiscal shocks in the presence of price rigid-
ities and heterogeneous households (Ricardians and
non-Ricardians). Finally, we analyze the impact of
different monetary policy approaches in response to
distinct government shocks.
Different persistence of shocks and financing
mechanisms. We begin by describing the behaviour of
private consumption in response to different persistence
values of civilian spending shocks.22 The ‘crowding-in’
effect clearly emerges in the benchmark case
(nm ¼ 0:81), while if we increase the value of nm to
0.93, we observe a small decrease in private consumption
expenditure. Accordingly, when we fix nm equal to 0.99
we obtain a large ‘crowding-out’ effect on consumption.
Focusing on military spending, we consider the fol-
lowing exercise. We start by fixing m equal to 0.93. We
then decrease it to 0.81 and, finally, we reset it to 0.99.
Private consumption responds negatively in the pres-
ence of high shock persistence, whereas it increases
when m is low.
A crucial aspect of our impulse response analysis is
also related to the different financing mechanisms of
civilian and military spending. As we explained before,
in our benchmark calibration, we consider the responses
of taxes to civilian (nm) and military (m) expenditures
equal to 0.16 and 0.18, respectively. As regards the
response of taxes to budget deficit (b), we assume it
equal to 0.1. In the following exercise, we change the
values of the parameters nm and m, keeping fixed the
parameterization for b. As we show in Figure E.7 in the
Online appendix, our objective is to assess the different
reactions of total private consumption to these changes.
We start by analyzing the case of a positive shock to
civilian expenditure. We assume three different values for
nm, that are 0.01, 0.16 (benchmark case) and 0.99. The
‘crowding-in’ effect on private consumption remains
unchanged in all three cases. However, the magnitude of
the rise in total consumption expenditure changes substan-
tially. Interestingly, when the response of taxes to civilian
spending is particularly high, the increase of private con-
sumption is modest compared with the case of a low nm.
In order to explain the last result, we need to take into
account the negative wealth effect onRicardian households
caused by the increase of the tax burden.The high response
of taxes to a rise in civilian spending generates a substantial
wealth effect on Ricardian agents, postponing their current
consumption.On the contrary, ifnm is low, the increase in
tax burden is small and Ricardian households do not sig-
nificantly change their level of consumption. As a conse-
quence, the ‘crowding-in’ effect is larger.
Turning to the military spending shock, the ‘crowd-
ing-out’ reduces if the value of m increases. A low value
of m implies a sharp increase of the budget deficit in
response to the military spending shock. This siphons
further resources away from potential consumption of
Ricardian households because they end up holding all
22 See Figure E.6 in the Online appendix.
the government bonds. On the contrary, with a high
value of m, the increase of budget deficit is less accen-
tuated. The latter, in turn, reduces the ‘crowding-out’
effect on private consumption.
Heterogeneous households, price rigidities and
monetary policy. Although the distinction between
Ricardian and non-Ricardian households is crucial for
our setup, it is not the only difference between our
framework and standard real business cycle (RBC) mod-
els assessing the effects of government shocks on private
consumption. Indeed, price rigidities and monetary pol-
icy play an important role in the response of private
consumption to fiscal shocks. In what follows, we pro-
vide several robustness checks in order to clarify these
aspects. In order to save space we show the IRFs related
to these sensitivity analyses in the Online appendix
(Figures E.8E.10).
We begin by analyzing the dynamic responses of private
consumption to positive civilian and military spending
shocks under our baseline calibration and with different
parameterizations of . The main results of our analysis
do not change if we assume a lower value of  equal to 0.3.
The last result confirms that ourmodel is able to predict the
‘crowding-in’ effect without the presence of a substantial
share of non-Ricardian consumers.On the contrary, under
the standard assumption of RBCmodels (accounting only
for Ricardian households), our model generates a negative
response of private consumption to the increase in civilian
spending. Evidently, this is in sharp contrast with the
empirical evidence we have shown above.
Focusing on price rigidities and assuming lower values
of the Calvo price probability (0 and 0.3, respectively),
we find that private consumption falls in response to a
rise in civilian expenditure. In the case of military spend-
ing, moving from our new Keynesian benchmark toward
models with neoclassical characteristics, we find that the
negative response of consumption is strengthened. Inter-
estingly, the magnitude of the negative impact is in
accordance with the findings in the defense economics
literature using partial equilibrium specification.23
Monetary policy is also a relevant transmission channel
of government spending shocks on private consumption.
In particular, we assume the case in which all the model
parameters have the same values as in Table III except for
the policy rate response to inflation () that varies from
1.5 (benchmark case) to 5 and 10. A high value of 
implies a more aggressive monetary policy. In the presence
of an aggressive monetary policy, the effect of an increase
in civilian spending on private consumption is negative.
In this case, Ricardian households increase their labor
supply as a consequence of the intertemporal substitution
effect. This occurs when a rise in inflation triggers an
increase in the real interest rate, thus providing incentives
for Ricardians to postpone consumption. On the con-
trary, a less aggressive monetary policy (low value of )
implies a lower real interest rate and thereby weakens
Ricardians’ incentives to postpone consumption. Finally,
as expected, higher values of  strengthen the ‘crowding-
out’ effect in the case of military spending shocks.
Conclusions
This article analyzed the effects of US fiscal policy shocks on
private consumption over the period 1960:Q1 to 2013:Q4.
The contribution of our analysis is that we distinguished
between civilian and military spending shocks. Our empiri-
cal approach allowed us to assess several transmission chan-
nels through which these different government components
affect theUS economy. In this regard, we found that civilian
spending shocks are less persistent thanmilitary ones.More-
over, our VAR estimates provided evidence that military
expenditure is usually financed through increases in gov-
ernment deficit. As a consequence, our impulse response
analysis showed that civilian spending shocks have a largely
positive effect on private consumption. On the contrary, a
negative impact was found between military spending
shocks and consumption responses. We also assessed the
effects of civilian and military shocks on the US economy
for two subsamples corresponding to the ‘great inflation’
and the ‘great moderation’ periods, respectively. Our
results indicated that the transmission channels of civilian
and military spending shocks have changed over time. In
particular, the persistence of civilian shocks is larger in the
post-1980 period, implying less significant effects on the
several macroeconomic aggregates. On the contrary, the
negative effects of military spending shocks are stronger
in the ‘great moderation’ period.
As a second step of our analysis, we adopted a new
Keynesian DSGE model in order to replicate our empiri-
cal findings. In this regard, focusing on increases in mil-
itary spending, we were able to simulate the negative
consumption response of the VAR estimates reproducing
the same main transmission channels. First, the high per-
sistence of this expenditure increases the negative income
effect on Ricardian households. Thus, these agents reduce
drastically their consumption implying the ‘crowding-out’
effect. Second, a positive response of the budget deficit,
through which military spending is generally financed,23 See, for example, Pieroni (2009).
leads to a further reduction in the consumption of Ricar-
dian agents that prefer to hold government bonds. Our
model also predicts that the lower persistence of civilian
expenditure from its own shocks reduces the negative
wealth effect associated with Ricardian agents. When this
effect is associated with a strong rise in the real wage, we
observe a positive response of aggregate consumption.
Indeed, a high real wage stimulates the consumption of
non-Ricardians that dominates the fall in consumption of
Ricardian households.
Although we believe that this analysis is a useful con-
tribution to more effective management of fiscal policy
tools on the expenditure side, it does leave several inter-
esting questions open for future research. In particular,
issues in estimating the DSGE model parameters have
received increasing interest in the macroeconometric lit-
erature. Accordingly, a theoretical framework that
includes Bayesian estimation provides promising oppor-
tunities for future research.
Replication data
All material necessary for reproducing the analysis, along
with the Online appendix, can be found at http://
www.prio.org/jpr/datasets.
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